Class II: April 19 Faith and Reason
Reading: Alfred J. Freddoso, "The Necessity for Revelation: A Primer on Summa Contra Gentiles 1, Chaps. 1-9")
Supplementary reading: Alvin Plantinga, "Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments" https://appearedtoblogly.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/plantinga-alvin-22two-dozen-or-so-theistic-arguments221.pdf
As Freddoso points out, Aquinas divides human knowledge of God (wisdom of the highest kind) into two kinds: "In those things that we profess about God there are two types of truths. For there are some truths about God that exceed every capacity of human reason, such as that God is [both] three and one. But there are other truths that natural reason is also capable of arriving at, such as that God exists, that there is one God, and others of this sort. Indeed, philosophers, led by the light of natural reason, have proved these truths about God demonstratively" (quoted from Chapter 3 of Summa Contra Gentiles).
Fredosso comments, "St. Thomas thus divides revealed truths into what he elsewhere calls the mysteries [or: articles] of the faith, which "exceed every capacity of human reason," and the preambles of the faith, which reason can at least in principle establish on its own. In other words, if we are to accept the mysteries of the faith at all, we must accept them on faith, whereas it is at least in principle possible for us even in this life to have evident philosophical knowledge of the preambles of the faith.
When thinking about these passages, you should take into consideration the following passages from the Catechism of the Catholic Church:
#26: "Faith is man's response to God, who reveals himself and gives himself to man, at the same time bringing man to a superabundant light as he searches for the ultimate meaning of life."
#36: "Our holy mother, the Church, holds and teaches that God, the first principle and last end of all things, can be known with certainty from the created world by the natural light of reason (quoted from the First Vatican Council). Without this capacity, man would not be able to welcome God's revelation. Man has this capacity because he is created 'in the image of God'.
In #37, the CCC goes on to say, "Though human reason is, strictly speaking, truly capable by its own natural power and light of attaining to a true and certain knowledge of the one personal God, who watches over and controls the world by providence, and of the natural law written in our hearts by the Creator, yet there are many obstacles which prevent reason from the effective and fruitful use of this inborn faculty."
And #38 continues, "This is why man stands in need of being enlightened by God's revelation . . . so th (at even in the present condition of the human race [the above mentioned truths] can be known by all men with ease, firm certainty and with no admixture of error."
A question about the certain knowledge which, according to #38, is presupposed by revelation and faith: Does this knowledge require a demonstration of the existence of God? What are some ways in which it could be known that God exists other than having demonstrated that God exists?
One famous negative reply, from Alvin Plantinga: A person can know that God exists without any argument; such belief can be "properly basic" for human beings. You can read the details in the article "The Epistemology of Religion," in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (www.plato.stanford.edu). Plantinga begins by attacking "enlightenment epistemology," the view that it's reasonable for person to believe that p only if it is evident to the senses that p, self-evident to the person that p, or derived via a sound deductive argument or strong non-dediuctive argument from such premises. A major problem with that view is that the view itself does not satisfy the criterion it lays down. Planting goes on to point out that within "reformed Christianity" (aka Calvinism) there is a tradition that it can be fully reasonable for a person to believe things about God in certain circumstances, e.g., to believe that God created all this while contemplating the starry heavens, or that God has forgiven me after I make a good confession.
Nevertheless, Plantinga is interested in arguments for the existence of God, as can be seen from his "Two dozen (or so) theistic arguments." Is his position consistent with #36 of the CCC, quoted above?
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