Class III

An after thought about the class of April 19 

The second meeting of the course dealt with the relation of natural human reason to divine revelation. We spent some time on #36 of CCC, which repeats the statement of the First Vatican Council, (A) "God, the first principle and last end of all things, can be known with certainty from the created world by the natural light of human reason," and adds, (B) "Without this capacity, man would not be able to welcome God's revelation." The statement quoted from Vatican I is clear enough, but the addition is puzzling. Why would "this capacity" be thought necessary for man "to welcome" divine revelation. This morning, I went carefully over the context of (A) in the documents of Vatican I. The relevant document is the Dogmatic constitution on the catholic faith, in Session Three, Chapters 2 (On revelation), 3 (On faith), and 4 (on faith and reason). Statement (A) in CCC is taken word for word from Chapter 2. But nowhere in the document could I find anything like the puzzling addition (B). I did, however, find passages in Chapter 2 which suggest strongly that the human capacity to know God with certainty by the natural light of human reason is necessary in order that the "submission of our faith should be in accordance with reason" and not "a blind movement of the mind." Chapter 2 says, "In order that the submission of our faith should be in accordance with reason, it was God's will that there should be linked to internal assistance of the Holy Spirit outward indications of this revelation, that is to say, divine acts, and first and foremost miracles and prophesies which clearly demonstrating as they do the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God, are the most certain signs of revelation and are suited to the understanding of all. . . .So that we could fulfil our duty of embracing the true faith and of persevering unwaveringly in it, God, through his only begotten Son, founded the church, and he endowed his institution with clear notes to the end that she might be recognized by all as the guardian and teacher of the revealed word. . . . So it comes about that, like a standard lifted up for the nations, she both invites to herself those who have not yet believed and likewise assures her sons and daughters that the faith they profess rests on the firmest of foundations." But the "outward indications of this revelation, that is to say divine acts and first and foremost miracles and prophesies" would not be "the most certain signs of revelation, suited to the understanding of all," unless human beings were able to know God by the natural light of reason. Similarly, those miracles and prophesies, together with the characteristics of the church, would not be an "invitation to [the peoples] who have not yet believed" unless they already had or could be given some natural knowledge of God. 

For the class on May 3 

Topic for the class: "We only know God truly when we believe that he is far above all that man can possibly think of God, for the divine essence surpasses man's natural knowledge, as stated above (Ch.3)" Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One, Ch. 5. The distinction between Classical Theisn and Theistic Personalism.

Readings: Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 1, a.1 and Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, Ch 5; Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, third edition, Chapter 1. Supplementary Reading: Barry Miller, A Most Unlikely God, Chapter 1. 

In addition to the readings, it would be useful to listen to some or all of the seven 5-minute talks by Elmar Kremer in www.wi-phi.com. Look for my name in the list of contributors. I will send links to the readings from Brian Davies and Barry Miller as attachments to an email message addressed to all of those who have been attending the class. 

Brian Davies sets forth an understanding of the nature of God which he calls "Classical Theism," and he contrasts it with a view which he calls "Theistic Personalism," and which is held by a number of those who publish and teach Philosophy of Religion. "Classical Theism," he says, "is what you can find in the writings of the Jewish author Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), the Islamic author Avicenna(980-1037), and the Christian author Thomas Aquinas (1224/6-74)." "Classical theism," he adds "is what all Jews, Christians, and Muslims believed for many centuries (officially, at least)" (p. 2). On this account, we must "sharply distinguish" God from all other things. For example, things other than God are subject to the causal activity of other things, but God is not so subject; and things other than God are able to undergo change, but God is unchangeable (immutable). In Davies' view, no positive description can be true of God and a creature in the same sese of the word. "Theistic Personalism," by contrast, is the view that God is a person in the same sense of the word in which Socrates is a person. Theistic Personalists agree that God's wisdom, power, etc. are different from that of any creature by being perfect wisdom, perfect power, etc., but in their view the difference is one of degree, not of kind. Let's say that a person is something that has knowledge and will. The Classical Theist holds that God has knowledge, and will, in different sense of the words than any creature, and hence is a person in a different sense of the word than any creature. Theistic Personalists, by contrast, hold that God's knowledge and will differ from those of any creature only in degree. 

 The opening sentence of the documents of the Fourth Lateran Council (an ecumenical council which opened in 1215 A.D.) contain a good summary of Classical Theism, together with the doctrine of the Trinity. It is quoted in the Catechism of the Catholic Church in #202: "We firmly believe and confess without reservation that there is only one true God, eternal, infinite (immensus) and unchangeable, incomprehensible, almighty and ineffable, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; three persons indeed, but one essence, substance or nature entirely simple." 

Barry Miller gives an account of the nature of God similar to that given by Davies. Like Davies, he draws a sharp distinction between God and everything else. But for Miller the distinction is rooted in the fact that God is not distinct from His existence (or, as Aquinas said, God is Subsistent Existence) whereas for a creature existence is an accidental property (a property the creature might not have had).

Following Aquinas, Miller emphasises the doctrine of divine simplicity. Miller adds to Davies' account a robust defence of that doctrine and an explanation of the difference in the sense in which God and a creature can be said to be wise, or to have any other positive property. Miller contrasts his own account of the nature of God with what he calls "Perfect Being Theology, and accuses Perfect Being Theology of treating God as just another being in the world. 

 The doctrine that God is immutable, held by both Davies and Miller, has been confronted by what seem obvious examples of God's changing. It's clear, is it not, that God was written about by Aquinas before He was written about by Davies? I will take up this objection in class.